Consent Searches and Voluntariness: An Analysis of Maryland Cases by Carey, David
University of Baltimore Law Forum
Volume 19
Number 2 Winter, 1989 Article 7
1989
Consent Searches and Voluntariness: An Analysis
of Maryland Cases
David Carey
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/lf
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in
University of Baltimore Law Forum by an authorized editor of ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. For more information, please
contact snolan@ubalt.edu.
Recommended Citation
Carey, David (1989) "Consent Searches and Voluntariness: An Analysis of Maryland Cases," University of Baltimore Law Forum: Vol.
19 : No. 2 , Article 7.
Available at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/lf/vol19/iss2/7
Consent Searches and 
Voluntariness: An Analysis of 
Maryland Cases 
The search warrant requirement of the 
fourth amendment I is the individual's pri-
mary protection against constitutionally 
proscribed unreasonable searches and sei-
zures. However, one is not entitled to the 
protection of the fourth amendment when 
he has waived his right to its protection; 
such is the case with a "consent search,"2 
which occurs when one waives his or her 
expectation of privacy with respect to the 
place searched.3 In order for a consent 
search to be valid, the prosecution must 
prove that the consent to search was vol-
untarily given .. Establishing voluntariness 
based on the decisions of the Maryland 
courts of appeal is the topic of this article. 
Through an analysis of the relevant 
Supreme Court and Maryland decisions, a 
rough road map emerges that can assist an 
attorney in attacking a case in which the 
voluntariness of a consent to search is at 
issue. 
L The Supreme Court Decisions 
The Supreme Court's first close scrutiny 
of the voluntariness aspect of the consent 
search was in Bumper 'V. North Carolina, S 
in which police had secured a search war-
rant to search the house where the defen-
dant lived with his grandmother. When 
police told the woman they had a search 
warrant, she allowed them to search. The 
prosecution did not rely on the warrant at 
trial, but on the consent of the defendant's 
grandmother. The Court ruled the consent 
was not voluntary, holding that "[w]hen a 
prosecutor seeks to rely upon consent to 
justify the lawfulness of a search, he has 
the burden of proving that the consent was 
in fact freely and voluntarily given. This 
burden cannot be discharged by showing 
no more than acquiescence to a claim of 
lawful authority."6 
by David Carey 
The question of how the prosecution 
demonstrates that a consent was "freely 
and voluntarily given" was placed squarely 
before the Supreme Court in Schneckloth 
'V. Bustamante.? Justice Stewart, writing for 
the majority, rejected the argument that 
the police must advise an individual of the 
right to refuse to consent to a search, just 
as a police officer must warn an individual 
of the right to remain silent during a custo-
dial interrogation,8 because "it would be 
impractical to impose on the normal con-
sent search the detailed requirements of an 
effective warning."9 The Court also reject-
ed the defendant's argument that the test 
for voluntariness should be the one applied 
in Johnson 'V. Zerbst, 10 that of "an inten-
tional relinquishment of a known right or 
privilege."11 This "knowing and intelli-
gent" standard, Justice Stewart stated, 
applies to those rights which the Constitu-
tion guarantees in order to preserve a fair 
trial,12 e.g., waiver of the right to counsel 
in a federal criminal trial,13 waiver of right 
to a jury trial,14 waiver of the right to a 
speedy trial. IS "The protections of the 
fourth amendment are of a wholly dif-
ferent order and have nothing to do 
whatever with promoting the fair ascer-
tainment of truth at a criminal trial."16 
Thus, the Court reasoned, there is no need 
to impose on the prosecution the height-
ened burden of proving that the waiver was 
"knowing and intelligent." Rather, volun-
tariness should be determined by analyz-
ing all the circumstances of an individual 
consent in order to ascertain "whether in 
fact it was voluntary or coerced."17 Signifi-
cantly, knowledge of the right to refuse 
consent is merely one of the factors to be 
taken into account, along with the age, 
intelligence and emotional state of the sub-
ject, the behavior of the police, etc. 
No single factor will ipso focto make the 
consent valid or invalid.18 Rather, the "to-
tality of the circumstances"19 should be 
analyzed in full. 
Because this analysis emphasizes an 
examination of all the relevant cir-
cumstances, factors rarely occur in isola-
tion. Most cases involve the weighing of 
different factors, some pointing to volun-
tariness, others toward a finding or coer-
cion. Not all factors are weighed evenly. 
The court will sift the unique facts and cir-
cumstances of each case2° and assign a 
weight to each factor depending upon its 
significance in that particular case. Since 
each factor is analyzed completely within 
the context of the case in which it appears, 
one cannot attach a precise value to a par-
ticular factor for all cases. However, in 
cases before the Maryland courts, certain 
factors are consistenly given primary 
importance in the overall totality of the 
circumstances analysis, while other factors 
are consistently of lesser, or secondary, 
importance. Knowing which factors are 
considered primary and which are con-
sidered secondary in the overall evaluation 
of voluntariness will allow an attorney to 
more effectively present his or her case to 
the court and give the attorney a better 
idea of the likelihood of success in a partic-
ular case. 
ll_ Factors Tending to Show Coercion in 
Maryland 
Judging by the decisions of the Court of 
Appeals of Maryland and Court of Special 
Appeals of Maryland, the prosecution 
more often than not meets its burden of 
proving a consent voluntary. However, in 
those cases where the prosecution does 
not, it is because the defence has presented 
evidence that one or more primary factors 
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affected the defendant's decision to con-
sent to the search. Three primary factors 
that show coercion can be identified from 
the decisions of the Maryland courts of 
appeal: (1) intimidation of the defendant, 
either physical or psychological, by a law 
enforcement officer; (2) an invalid claim of 
lawful authority by an officer; and (3) 
prior illegal police activity leading to a 
consent. 
A. Intimidation 
The first of these factors was present in 
Johnson v. State,21 in which the Court of 
Special Appeals of Maryland invalidated a 
consent that it found was based on sheer 
physical intimidation. In this case, the 
defendant and an associate left the defen-
dant's apartment and drove off in the 
defendant's car. They were followed by 
police at least two unmarked cars, one of 
which pulled next to them at a red traffic 
light. Two plainclothes officers approach-
ed the car with shotguns drawn and did 
not announce that they were police offi-
cers. The defendant accelerated through 
the red light, while another police car 
apprehended them fifty yards down the 
road. The defendant and his associate were 
taken from the car, forced to assume a 
spread eagle position, and searched. The 
search revealed narcotics in the car and on 
the defendant's person. The defendant's 
hands were manacled behind him and he 
was put in the back seat of the police car. 
Three or four police officers were in the 
car with him while other uniformed offi-
cers remained outside. Within. fifteen 
minutes of the arrest, the defendant verbal-
ly consented to a search of his apartment. 
Thirty-five to forty minutes later, the 
defendant signed a "consent-to-search" 
form. His hands were uncuffed to allow 
him to sign the form and then recuffed. 
The police advised him that if narcotics 
were found, charges would be brought 
against him, and that he had a right not to 
consent. 
The court found that the physical intimi-
dation present in this case was substantial 
enough to show that the consent was 
coerced. Although factors that favor 
voluntariness were present, the court 
found that the physical intimidation was 
substantial enough to render the consent 
coerced. Citing "the melodramatic atmos-
phere of Johnson's midnight apprehension 
at gunpoint, followed by his confinement 
to the back seat of a police car with his 
hands manacled behind his back,"22 the 
court stated that "[i]t is hard to imagine a 
more coercive atmosphere than appears 
from the facts of the instant case."n 
In Whitman v. State, 24 the intimidation 
was psychological, not physical, but the 
court nevertheless found that the consent 
was coerced. The defendant was a truck 
driver suspected to be transporting illegal 
unstamped cigarettes. He was arrested 
shortly after midnight without probable 
cause, given is Miranda warnings and taken 
to a State Highway Association (SHA) 
barn in a state police car while a police 
officer drove his truck there. The defen-
dant was twenty-three years old, had a 
CTTlhe prosecution 
more often than not 
meets its burden of 
proving a consent 
voluntary" 
tenth grade education, and had no prior 
criminal involvement. While in custody, 
he was treated with civility, was not 
handcuffed, was not threatened', could 
move around and smoke, and did not 
complain of being denied food or drink. 
However, he was subjected to questioning 
in the SHA barn for ninety minutes by 
two state troopers and one assistant state's 
attorney. An application for a search 
warrant was typed in his presence, a phone 
call was made in his presence to a judge 
about signing the warrant that was being 
typed, the police unequivocally stated that 
they could conduct the search whether he 
consented or not, and the defendant was 
told by police that type would be saved if 
he consented. After ninety minutes in 
custody, at 2:30 a.m., the defendant 
consented to the search. 
Although there was no physical 
intimidation as in Johnson, the court found 
the consent invalid because of the coercive 
psychological atmosphere. Despite the fact 
that the defendant was treated with 
civility, was not cuffed or restrained, was 
free to move about and smoke, and was 
not threatened at all, the court found that 
"the psychological atmosphere was 
critically suggestive."25 It is this form of 
subtle coercion, the court pointed out, 
that the Supreme Court has proscribed. 
The lesson articulated by Bumper and 
Schneckloth is that the individual 
subjected to the search may indeed be 
submitting rather than consenting, 
even in an atmosphere of relative 
cordiality because of the presence of 
psychological forces as potent and 
effectual in achieving a 'consent' as the 
traditional techniques and familiar 
instruments of physical 'persuasion.'26 
The actions by the officers in this case 
were found to be calculated to make the 
defendant think that insistence on his 
fourth amendment rights would only 
delay the inevitable search rather than pro-
tect him from unreasonable searches.27 
The holding in Jarrell v. State, 28 rein-
forces this view. Jarrell was legally arrested 
after his car was stopped, and a valid auto-
mobile exception search was revealed ten 
pounds of marijuana. The defendant was 
taken to the police station, given his 
Miranda warnings, told that his residence 
had been secured by placing two officers 
each at the front and rear entrances, and 
was asked for consent to search the house. 
He verbally consented and signed the con-
sent form. At the pre-trial hearing, he 
stated that he consented to the search 
because one officer had told him that if he 
did not consent, his codefendant would be 
released. This testimony was not rebutted 
by the state. In ruling that the consent was 
coerced, the court cited both the unrebut-
ted testimony of the defendant and the 
"inherently coercive"29 atmosphere. Rely-
ing on Whitman, the court held that the 
statement to the defendant that his house 
was secured by four officers "was calcu-
lated to persuade Jarrell that the seach was 
inevitable, with or without consent,"30 
and was therefore coerced. If the psycho-
logical atmosphere is calculated to make 
the defendant think that the issuance of a 
warrant will be automatic, then consent is 
not a voluntary decision on the part of the 
defendant but in acquiescence to the inevi-
table. 
B. Invalid Claim of Lawful Authority 
By An Officer 
In the recent case of Titow v. State,31 the 
court addressed the second of three prima-
ry factors showing coercion. The defen-
dant was stopped at an airport on at least 
reasonable suspicion if not probable cause, 
and was asked to consent to a search of his 
luggage. Even though he refused, the offi-
cers told him that they were going to seize 
the luggage and issue a receipt for it. The 
defendant then consented. The court 
found it significant that the officers 
misrepresented the fourth amendment 
rights of the defendant by implying that 
they had the authority to search the lug-
gage regardless of whether the defendant 
consented or not, because this was not a 
correct description of defendant's constitu-
tional options. Had there been probable 
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cause, the bag could have been seized, but 
the officers would still have been required 
to obtain a warrant to search it; if they 
could not obtain a warrant, the bag would 
have been returned unsearched; had there 
been reasonable suspicion, the officers 
could only hold the luggage for a limited 
period of time for a dog to sniff. The court 
held that this was similar to the situation 
that the Supreme Court faced in Bumper 'fJ. 
North Carolina,32 where the police claimed 
to have a valid warrant, except that in 
Titow, "the claim of lawful authority that 
was effectively communicated to the 
appellant-through a combination of 
words, actions and selected silence-was 
'You may as well consent to the search of 
the luggage because we are going to hold it 
(and presumably search it) in any event' "33 
The court further stated that 
[t]he appellant was not only uninform-
ed as to his full constitutional options, 
he was, at least by strong implication, 
affirmatively misled as to those 
options. A significant misrepresenta-
tion, by commission or omission, of 
the constitutional choices available to 
him is a strong circumstance, in the 
larger totality of circumstances, mili-
tating against the voluntary quality of 
the appellant's consent.34 
There is a close relationship between 
cases of intimidation and cases of acquies-
cence to a claim of lawful authority.35 In 
Whitman and Jarrel~ consent was coerced 
because the psychological atmosphere was 
calculated to make the defendant think 
that his refusing consent would be ineffec-
tual. In Titow, the consent was coerced 
because the defendant was misled as to his 
true constitutional options. 
However, it should be noted that the 
advice of a police officer, based on his 
experience and his analysis of the present 
situation, that a warrant will probably be 
issued, will not invalidate a consent. As the 
court said in Whitman, "the well founded 
advice of a law enforcement agent that, 
absent consent to search, a warrant can be 
obtained does not constitute coercion."36 
The key is whether the advice is the pro-
duct of an officer's reasoned judgment as 
to the likelihood of a neutral and detached 
magistrate finding probable cause, or is 
merely an attempt to induce a defendant 
into thinking that refusing consent would 
only delay the inevitable, and is not based 
on the officer's own judgment as to the 
possibility of securing a warrant. As the 
above cases suggest, misleading a defendant 
as to his true constitutional options in 
order to obtain a consent is a strong factor 
tending to show coercion. 
C. Prior Illegality 
The third primary factor in the analysis 
of voluntariness is a prior illegal act by the 
police. Consent has been found to be 
coerced when this factor, along with 
others, was present. In Johnson 'fJ. State, 37 a 
prior illegal police action was found. The 
court ruled that the initial stop of the 
defendant's car was without probable 
cause, and that probable cause was only 
obtained when the defendant subsequently 
sped through a red light. Although the 
court noted the illegal police action, it was 
the physical intimidation that rendered the 
consent coerced. In State 'fJ. Wilson, 38 the 
police entered the defendant's apartment 
based on a valid search warrant for nar-
cotics. While executing the search, an offi-
cer copied down the serial numbers of 
various pieces of electronic equipment in 
the apartment that he thought might be 
stolen. The court ruled that this was an 
unconstitutional seizure.39 Upon return-
ing to the police station, the officer learned 
that the serial number on a tape recorder 
in the defendant's room was the same as 
the serial number on one reported stolen 
from an apartment in that area. The next 
evening the police went to the defendant's 
apartment and were let in by his room-
mates. They spotted the defendant, told 
him that stolen property had been 
observed in his room the night before by 
a uniformed officer, advised the defendant 
of his Miranda rights, and asked him to 
"relinquish" the tape recorder. He replied 
that it was in his room and he led police 
officers to it. The court embarked on a 
thorough analysis of all the circumstances 
surrounding the consent, noting that the 
defendant was not in custody, he was in 
"fAJn illegal seizure 
does not 
automatically render 
a consent coerced." 
his own apartment with his roommates, he 
was advised of his Miranda rights, and he 
led the police to the tape recorder. The 
court ruled that this evidence of 
voluntariness was not sufficient to 
overcome the prior illegal police seizure 
and the order coercive factors. Because the 
police were let into the apartment by the 
defendant's roommates and because the 
officers did not reveal that the search 
executed the preViOUS night was 
unconstitutional, the defendant could 
reasonably have believed that they were 
still acting under the authority of the 
warrant used the night before. In addition, 
the court found it significant that although 
the police advised the defendant of his 
Miranda rights, they did not advise him of 
his right not to consent, and that one 
without the other could reasonably have 
led him to believe that he did not have the 
option of refusing consent. In addition, the 
officer's request that he "relinquish" the 
recorder may have reinforced the view 
that this was a demand that must be 
complied with and not a request which 
could lawfully be refused. 
In its analysis of the totality of the 
circumstances, the court paid special 
attention to the prior illegal seizure. 
Although an illegal seizure "does not auto-
matically render evidence obtained by a 
subsequent consent search inadmissible,"40 
the court ruled that it will'render a consent 
coerced unless the prosecution presents 
strong evidence of consent," 4 I The evi-
dence in this case was insufficient. Thus, 
when a defendant presents evidence that a 
prior illegal seizure was a factor in his giv-
ing consent, it is likely that the consent 
will be ruled coerced, unless rebutted by 
the prosecution presenting strong evidence 
of voluntariness. This case concerned a 
prior illegal seizure; it is unclear whether 
this is also true with respect to prior illegal 
arrests42 and searches. 
III. Factors Tending To Show 
Vol untariness 
An examination of the cases in which 
the prosecution has prevailed in Maryland 
reveal two primary factors that show 
voluntariness. The first factor is evidence 
that, in addition to consenting to a war-
rantless search, the defendant cooperated 
with the police in either executing the 
search or in aiding the overall investiga-
tion. The second primary factor tending 
toward voluntariness is the giving of con-
sent motivated by the belief of the consent-
ing party that the police will not find the 
object of the search. 
A. Cooperation With The Police 
In Lewis 'fJ. State,43 the defendant, who 
was not originally a suspect to the murder 
of his wife and child, was asked by police 
for permission to search his house in order 
to "go through personal papers and things 
like that". 44 He was going to be out of 
town, so he arranged to leave a key to his 
home with a neighbor to allow police 
access to his house. While the police were 
searching, they found a poem that the 
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defendant had written that implicated him 
in the murder. The court held that the 
consent was voluntary because the defen-
dant had indicated a purpose of 
cooperating with the police and then 
affirmatively made arrangements for the 
police to obtain a key during his absence. 
This was sufficient to indicate that the con-
sent was voluntary. 
A defendant who was in jail argued that 
he was coerced into consenting to give hair 
and saliva samples in Simms 'fl. State. 45 The 
police explained to the defendant that they 
wanted the samples and they showed him 
how to drop a few drops of saliva on the 
paper, which the defendant did. The offi-
cer then selected hairs from his head and 
cut them off without objection from the 
defendant. The defendant had not been 
forcibly brought but rather walked from 
his cell on request. During the procedure 
there were no threats or promises made, 
and defendant was standing alone and was 
not held or cuffed by the officers. The 
court held that the seizure of the hair and 
saliva was the product of a voluntary con-
sent. 
In A rm'Wood 'fl. State, 46 the police had 
arrived at a house intended for surveil-
lance. The suspect came out of the house, 
saw the police, and fled. The police yelled, 
"Halt," and defendant stopped. They did 
not touch him or search him, but they told 
him they had information that he had 
heroin in his apartment. The defendant 
said "You have got me," and said he 
would take the officers to where the drugs 
were. He led the officers to his third floor 
bedroom and pointed out the drugs. The 
court cited the defendant's cooperation 
with the police in taking them to his room 
and the lack of evidence of coercion in 
finding the consent voluntary.47 
B. Consent Based on Subject's Belief 
That Incriminating Evidence Would 
Not Be Found 
In Humphrey 'fl. State, 48 the police asked 
the defendant's wife to consent to a search 
of the home of herself and the defendant. 
The police told the woman that they were 
looking for evidence to be used in the pros-
ecution of the defendant for murder. She 
consented to the search and the police 
found two revolvers and $150 in cash that 
implicated the defendant. The court noted 
that the woman was not under the threat 
of arrest, that the police used no coercive 
tactics, that she was in her own home and 
that she had been told that she could refuse 
to consent. On the other hand, she had 
never experienced arrest or custody, she 
had only a tenth grade education, she was 
alone with her four young children, and 
she became nervous in the officers' pres-
ence. In holding the consent voluntary, the 
court took special note of the fact that the 
woman testified that she had consented 
because she did not believe that a search 
would uncover anything incriminating 
and that her consent was, in fact, a tactical 
decision "to turn suspicion away from 
[her husband] by appearing to give the 
authorities innocent and wholehearted 
cooperation."49 
In Logue 'fl. State, 50 the police asked the 
defendant's wife if they could search the 
house for the defendant. The defendant's 
wife went into the house, came back out, 
and consented. The police did not find the 
defendant, but they did seize clothes of his 
that matched a police description. The 
court ruled that the consent was voluntary 
because the wife knew that the defendant 
was not at home and had no reason to 
believe that the clothes were incriminat-
ing. Her consent was based on her belief 
that the police would not find anything to 
incriminate her husband. 
"[TJhe cumulative 
effects of two or more 
secondary factors 
could render 
them. .. one primary 
factor." 
The court applied the same reasoning in 
Borgen 'fl. State,51 in which the police 
requested that the defendant, who was in 
custody, consent to a search of his 
apartment for tools allegedly stolen from a 
garage where he worked. The defendant 
consented and the tools were found. At 
trial, he argued that the tools were actually 
his. The court, citing Humphrey, ruled that 
the consent was voluntarily given, that the 
defendant did not think that the tools were 
incriminating, and that his "willingness to 
allow the warrantless search to take place 
was basically a tactical decision calculated 
'to turn suspicion away from him.' "52 
IV. Secondary Factors in Maryland 
There are many other factors that are 
involved in a totality of the circumstances 
analysis. The five previously analyzed are 
those that the Maryland courts find 
especially indicative of whether a consent 
was voluntarily given. Other factors are 
secondary in importance, meaning that 
they are not as significant as the primary 
factors but still somewhat influential and 
thus worthy of scrutiny as part of the 
totality of the circumstances analysis. 
A. Knowledge of Fourth 
Amendment Rights 
Perhaps the most difficult secondary 
factor to classify is the knowledge of the 
consenting party of his or her right to 
refuse consent. In Schneckloth, the Court 
stated that this is merely a factor to be 
considered, along with others, and the 
Maryland courts have followed the 
Supreme Court's direction. Some cases 
have presented this factor in a context that 
renders the subject's knowledge of his or 
her rights extremely persuasive, as in 
Tito'W, in which police officers 
misrepresented the defendant's fourth 
amendment rights,53 and Wilson, where 
police advised the defendant of his 
Miranda rights but did not adivse him of 
his right to refuse to consent, thus 
implying that no such right existed.54 In 
other cases, the court noted that the 
subject was either advised of the right to 
refuse to consent,55 or was not,56 but this 
was not a significant factor. One argument 
based on the officers' failure to advise a 
defendant of his fourth amendment rights 
was rejected in Fidazzo 'fl. StateY The 
defendant argued that the Schneckloth 
holding applied only to non-custodial 
consents, and that a custodial consent is per 
se coerced unless the defendant is advised 
of his right to refuse consent. The court, 
citing United States 'fl. Watson, 58 stated that 
a "per se rule demanding a warning as a sine 
qua non is not called for under the fourth 
amendment, even where custody IS 
involved."59 
B. Written Evidence of Consent 
Another secondary factor that courts 
refer to is whether the consenting party 
signed a form consenting to the search. 
Although this factor has never been 
dispositive, it usually occurs in a case in 
which the defendant is aware of his right 
to refuse consent, because this notice is 
generally given on the consent form, and 
can be construed as evidence of 
cooperation with the police. Cases in 
which physical or psychological 
intimidation is at issue may also contain a 
signed consent form. Thus, a signed 
consent form has been held to be a factor 
both in cases ruling that the consent was 
voluntary60 and those finding the consent 
coerced.61 
Although not likely to be the deciding 
factor in settling the voluntariness issue, 
secondary factors are nonetheless 
important. Maryland case law has 
specifically stated that they are to be 
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considered, and in cases where they are no 
primary factors, they gain added signifi-
cance. Moreover, the cumulative effect of 
two or more secondary factors could 
render them as important as one primary 
factor. 
IV. Potentially Relevant Factors in 
Maryland 
There are other factors that are poten-
tially relevant which have not yet 
appeared in a case in which they play a 
critical role. For example, the age, educa-
tion, and familiarity with the criminal 
justice system of the consenting party, 
which has played a major role in many 
third party consent cases and are indeed 
mentioned in the analysis of consent 
search cases, have not yet been cited as 
controlling in any Maryland cases. Courts 
have taken notice of these factors,62 but 
they have not significantly affected the 
outcome of a case in Maryland. Thus, fac-
tors such as age and education should be 
considered when preparing a case for trial, 
because they may be highly relevant. 
Another potentially relevant factor has 
been addressed by the Court of Appeals of 
Maryland, but not completely enough to 
indicate whether it is of any true signifi-
cance. In Carter 'D. State, 63 the defendant 
argued that because he had a prior nar-
cotice conviction that he could not have 
freely consented to a search of his car that 
turned up narcotics. The court, in finding 
the consent voluntary, said that this is 
"only one of the circumstances to be con-
sidered by the court in determining" the 
validity of the consent.64 The court did not 
state if, or to what degree, this factor was 
significant. 
Whether the defendant is in custody 
when consenting to a search is another 
potentially relevant factor. 65 Like the 
other potentially relevant factors, the 
courts have mentioned custody as part of 
the totality of the circumstances to be ana-
lyzed, but have said little more. 
Rejected Factors In Maryland 
The only factor that has been explicitly 
rejected in Maryland as not relevant is 
deception by a police officer as to identity. 
In Killie '(.I. State, 66 an undercover state 
trooper did not reveal his true identity to 
the defendant, who invited him to his 
home. While there, the officer witnessed 
drug use by the defendant. The defendant 
argued that the consent given to the police 
officer to enter the house was per se invol-
untary, because it was gained by subter-
fuge. The court, recognizing the need for 
undercover work, rejected this argument 
and ruled that the defendant's reading of 
the fourth amendment was overbroad. 
Thus, deception by an officer as to identity 
when performing valid undercover work 
is not a factor in the totality of the cir-
cumstances analysis. 
V. Conclusion 
The foregoing analysis of Maryland 
decisions shows that determining whether 
a consent to search was voluntarily given 
can be a complex matter, because any 
number or combination of factors may be 
involved and the weight given to a particu-
lar factor may change from case to case. 
However, looking at these cases collectiv~ 
ly a certain hierarchy emerges, certain 
enough that particular factors can be iden-
tified and roughly labeled as either prima-
ry, secondary or potential factors. 
Attacking a voluntariness issue in a con-
sent search case based on Maryland law is 
even more difficult because of the relativ~ 
ly small number of cases on this issue that 
have been decided. Indeed, an attorney fac-
ed with such a case is advised to turn to 
other jurisdictions where many more cases 
of this type have been litigated.67 Howev-
er, as helpful as a factually similar case may 
be, it is important not to lose sight of the 
fact that this is a totality of the cir-
cumstances test, and that what is most 
important is not what one particular court 
has already said, but what all the cir-
cumstances of the case at hand indicate. It 
is in conjunction with a thorough analysis 
of the facts of a particular case that this 
analysis of what the Maryland courts have 
already said is most useful. 
Protect your employees. yaur 
company. and yoursell from the 
personal suHering and f,nanc,al 
loss of cancer ... call your local 
unit of the American Cancer 
SocIety and ask for their free 
pamphlet. "HelpIng Your 
Employees to Protect Them· 
selves Against Cancer." StM 
your company on a policy of 
good health todayl 
~AMERICAN CANCER • SOCIETY' 
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A defense 
against cancer 
can be cooked up 
in your kitchen. 
There is evidence that 
diet and cancer are related. 
Follow these modifications in 
your daily diet to reduce 
chances of getting cancer: 
1. Eat more high-fiber foods 
such as fruits and vegetables 
and whole-grain cereals. 
2. Include dark green and 
deep yellow fruits and vegeta-
bles rich in vitamins A and C. 
3. Include cabbage, broccoli, 
brussels sprouts, kohlrabi and 
cauliflower. 
4. Be moderate in consump-
tion of salt-cured, smoked, and 
nitrite-cured foods. 
5. Cut down on total fat in-
take from animal sources and 
fats and oils. 
6. Avoid obesity. 
7. Be moderate in consump-
tion of alcoholic beverages. 
I No one faces cancer alone. 
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